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Julie Locascio
In the 1980s, "Central America" became synonymous
with civil war, economic collapse, human rights abuse,
and refugee movement. Because of the complexities of
Central American politics, refugees from the region
have elicited a highly mixed response, ranging from
humanitarian to indifferent to hostile. Individuals and
agencies trying to serve these refugees or resettle them
are faced with constraints that are more political than
logistical.
Since the 1970s, 2-3 million refugees have been dis-
placed from their homes in Central America. Central
American refugees have presented an unprecedented
challenge to planners, relief workers, economists, poli-
ticians, administrators, community leaders, and others.
Analysis of the refugee planning enacted so far in the
region illustrates both appalling and exemplary approaches
that can shed light on refugee planning elsewhere.
History of International Refugee Planning
The modern system of international refugee assis-
tance evolved from the migration situations of World
Wars I and II. The U.N. set up the Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees to supervise the care of
refugees, which was to be entrusted to asylum nations.
The birth of UNHCR was accompanied by the 1951
Convention on Refugees, which pertained only to those
who had become refugees because of events prior to
January 1, 1951 (even though UNHCR was authorized
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to assist any refugees). The 1951 Convention guaran-
teed a refugee's right to make an asylum claim, but did
not guarantee a refugee's right to receive asylum. It
...defined a refugee as someone outside his country...,
unprotected by his own government and having a
well-founded fear of persecution on political, reli-
gious or racial grounds should he return. A person
fitting this definition had legal protection against
refoulement [involuntary repatriation]. 1
The High Commissioner lobbied for the expansion of
UNHCR's work beyond Europe, and the enlarged refu-
gee mandate was acknowledged in the Protocol of 31
January 1967.
General Regional Responses
Before the 1980s, extensive migration had existed
between Central American countries, but had been
mostly temporary. An analysis of why refugee move-
ments have become so rampant in Central America over
the last decade is beyond the scope of this article; suffice
it to say that each country's refugees share similar and
dissimilar reasons for migrating within or outside of the
region-reasons which include civil wars, state-spon-
sored terrorism, insurgent-sponsored terrorism, human
rights abuses, economic chaos, and environmental deg-
radation.
Though the flights of Central American refugees are
based on similar circumstances, the treatment of the
refugees depends on from where and to where they are
fleeing. The UNHCR has not succeeded in depoliti-
cizing refugee services in the region; therefore, the
myriads of other national and non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) responding to refugee needs have
been vital to refugee survival.
Honduras is the only country bordering all three civil
war zones-El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua-
and refugee policies there have become extremely po-
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liticized. Salvadoran, Honduran and U.S. officials in the
1980s continuously asserted that Salvadoran refugee
camps in Honduras were being used as guerilla staging
grounds. This official attitude encouraged local Hondu-
ran hostility to the refugees as well as hostility-to the
point of rape, beatings, and murders-among Honduran
soldiers "guarding" the refugee camps. 2 UNHCR was
not permitted to investigate any such attacks.
Honduras considered the refugees a temporary prob-
lem from the start, and never desired any solution short
of repatriation. In addition to a historic distrust of
Salvadorans, Honduras has shown resentment at having
international agencies operating within its borders.3
Because the Nicaraguan refugees of the 1980s were at
the other end of the political/refugee spectrum, they
were not considered an internal security threat andwere
thus allowed free movement and employment in Hon-
duras. Ironically enough, the Nicaraguan refugees caused
the displacement of some 100,000 Hondurans, but con-
tinued to receive preferential refugee treatment over
the Salvadoran refugees.4 TheUNHCR has struggled to
keep Nicaraguan refugees away from the Honduras/
Nicaragua border, whereas "the U.S...financed camps
right on the border for the explicit purpose of aiding the
contras."5
Mexico currently "hosts" more refugees from Central
America than any other regional actor (besides the
U.S.). Like Honduras, she dislikes having large concen-
trations of refugees along her border, although Mexico
has more legitimate security concerns since Guatema-
lan military forces have raided and bombed refugee
camps across the Mexican border.6 Mexico also fears
that the presence of Guatemalan refugees among kindred
Mexican Indians might elicit internal support for the
Guatemalan guerrillas.7
The UNHCR must channel aid through a Mexican
agency called COMAR, and can only assist refugees
officially designated by COMAR. The vast majority of
refugees in Mexico are not recognized by the Mexican
government. None of the Salvadorans are recognized at
all. Mexico has at times deported large numbers of
Central American refugees, despite protests by the
UNHCR, COMAR, and others. Because of the lack of
recognition for most refugees in Mexico, few have been
allowed to work.
Mexico, like Honduras, considered repatriation the
best solution, and, barring that, decided to move the
refugees away from the Guatemalan border. Most re-
fused to relocate: some fled the camps for other parts of
Mexico, and a few returned to Guatemala. Mexican
officials have taken extraordinary measures to coerce
relocation, including cutting offcamp supplies, burning
camps, interrogating and beating refugees, and detain-
ing and interrogating Catholic workers.8 Press and human
rights officials were barred access during the deporta-
tion periods, and UNHCR itselfwas barred camp access
for eleven days. Mexico has recently begun demonstrat-
ing more concern over the human rights abuses faced by
the Guatemalans, and since 1988 has ceased pressuring
for repatriation.
Nicaragua under the Sandinista government received
many refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala, as well
as providing a safe haven to many of the UNHCR's most
"difficult-to-place" refugees.9 Nicaragua offered incen-
tives to employers of refugees, and encouraged Salva-
doran-run agrarian cooperatives. It is unclear which
refugees will wish to or be allowed to continue seeking
asylum in Nicaragua under the unstable presidency of
Violeta Chamorro, or ifany such refugee programs have
been continued, particularly since Nicaragua is in the
process of receiving many returnees.
In the region, Costa Rica is the final significant host
of Central American refugees. Though also holding
partisan views of the regional conflicts, Costa Rica's
refugee reception in the 1980s was markedly more
humanitarian and less discriminatory than the recep-
tion offered by the other host countries, and is thus
worth a closer look.
Refugees in Costa Rica
Of all the regional refugee hosts, Costa Rica has
perhaps made the greatest effort to depoliticize assis-
tance to Central American refugees. Though not im-
mune from national ideologies and security concerns,
Costa Rica has offered a relatively more tranquil haven
for regional refugees.
Costa Rica is a tiny country (51,000 square kilome-
ters) with a population that only reached 3 million in
July 1990. The population changes from 1973-1984 in
Costa Rica were extraordinary: whereas the total popu-
lation of Costa Rica rose 29.1%, the Central American
alien population of Costa Rica rose 86%. By April 30,
1990, there were 48,565 officially registered refugees in
Costa Rica (mostly Central American), and estimates of
150,000 to 200,000 undocumented refugees.
The presidency of Oscar Arias (1986-1990) was marked
by heroic diplomatic efforts to settle the regional con-
flicts, culminating in the Arias Peace Plan of 198710 .
Costa Rica and Nicaragua subsequently signed the
Agreement on Voluntary Repatriation to begin mutual
assistance to the Nicaraguans in Costa Rican territory
who wished to return to Nicaragua, an agreement that
did not see much success until 1990.
In Costa Rica, national refugee policy is coordinated
byDIGEPARE-the General Directorate for Refugees.
The General Directorate oversees the refugee-related
activities of the Health Ministry, the Education Minis-
try, UNHCR, embassies, NGOs, etc., and evaluates and
approves all refugee projects in Costa Rica.
As ofMay 1990, there were six refugee camps in Costa
Rica, administered by a variety of organizations. Refu-
gees crossing the Nicaraguan border into Costa Rica are
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normally picked up by the Civil Guard and taken to one
of the two reception camps run by the International Red
Cross. Refugees receive assistance in education, nutri-
tion, and health. Children up to the age of 16 attend
school in the camps; UNHCR pays for supplies and
teacher salaries for the camp schools, which are run by
the Costa Rican Ministry ofPublic Education. Theoreti-
cally, refugees remain in Costa Rican reception camps
only one month (though in practice it often runs as high
as 6 months), and can then be transferred to Tilardn-a
camp run by the International Rescue Committee (IRC)-
-for a six-month transitory sojourn to get their legal
status processed. Costa Rican immigration officials
interview the refugees to see if they are eligible for
official refugee status under the 195 1 Convention or the
1967 Protocol. 11
After Tilar^n, refugees may move to IRC-run Achote
to receive physical and educational preparation for work
opportunities (agricultural and handicrafts, mostly).
Refugees in Achote continue to receive housing, water,
health care, etc., and general counseling on how to
integrate. IRC looks for businessmen or land owners
willing to hire refugee employees and willing to pay for
their Social Security tax. Thosewho stay in the camps are
free to work—mostly on nearby coffee, sugar cane, and
other farms; however, they cannot work until they have
general work authorization cards, as well as permission
from the Labor Ministry and the Social Security Minis-
try for the specific job requested. In theory, the culmina-
tion ofcamp life is supposed to be integration into Costa
Rican society via cooperatives, associations, etc. For
instance, several former Salvadoran camp-dwellers formed
a permanent cooperative settlement in Guanacaste that
has thrived for several years.
In reality, most refugees entering Costa Rica never
even go through the camp process; although most of
them remain undocumented refugees, some eventually
do go to the Immigration Department to apply for
asylum. Getting refugee status is a slow process in Costa
Rica and can take up to eight months. Temporary status
must be renewed every three months, but entitles the
refugees to a health examination and free health care
from the Costa Rican government, as well as free assis-
tance from the UNHCR.
Applying for work authorization is a separate and
equally lengthy process. Refugees used to be permitted
only to work in jobs that did not displace Costa Rican
workers. However, in January 1990, the Costa Rican
judiciary announced that refugees meeting any one of
the following conditions would be eligible for any type of
work: had been in Costa Rica over three years, were
married to a Costa Rican, or had a child born there.
UNHCR is not in direct control of refugee policies
and programs in Costa Rica but does provide technical
and financial support, as well as serve as liaison for the
variety of refugee service-providers in Costa Rica.
The Costa Rican Ministry ofPublic Education runs schools in the refugee camp.
UNHCR's total 1989 budget in Costa Rica was $6,072,000,
augmented by $425,000 worth of food donations from
the U.N. World Food Programme and miscellaneous
assistance from the UNDP.
In 1989, non-UNHCR contributions to refugee work
in Costa Rica included the following: housing funding
from Sweden; food from Japan, the European Eco-
nomic Community, and the Christian Association for
Relief Everywhere; medical supplies from Catholic Relief
Services; and hundreds ofprojects and programs funded
and/or run by a large assortment of Costa Rican and
foreign NGOs, as well as other foreign governments.
Costa Rica's refugee policies overall can be considered
fairly effective, humanitarian, and beneficial—remark-
able attributes given the recent volatility of the region.
Despite the breadth of refugee services available in
Costa Rica, the most satisfactory refugee service avail-
able in most instances is voluntary repatriation to the
refugee's country of origin at a time when it is safe and
fruitful to do so. After the defeat of the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua, it was generally assumed that
armed civil conflict there would end. Since Nicaraguans
were by far the largest refugee population in Costa Rica,
UNHCR began gearing up for massive repatriation.
Prior to June 1990, fewer than 100 Nicaraguans per
month were voluntarily repatriating: as of May 1990,
2,600 Nicaraguans had asked to repatriate.
Nevertheless, the situation in Nicaragua did not change
enough politically or economically to motivate all of the
refugees to repatriate. Many refugee workers in Costa
Rica told me that Nicaraguans were still crossing the
border into Costa Rica, and that massive volunteer
repatriation was unlikely because too many uncertain-
ties remained.
Unfortunately for the Nicaraguans and other refu-
gees, Costa Rica's welcome mat is slowly being with-
drawn. In a nutshell, "When refugees first started com-
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ing, the government was very generous; after eight years,
(a) the resources are limited, and (b) the refugee num-
bers have increased." 12 Though receiving a substantial
amount of international assistance for her refugee
population, Costa Rica's own economy is stagnating
(for a variety of reasons), and she is under increasing
social pressure to repatriate refugees. The government
of Costa Rica has, nevertheless, been one of the region's
strongest advocates of continued UNHCR refugee-plan-
ning in the region.
International Refugee Agreements
Though national security concerns have dominated
regional responses to Central American refugee move-
ments, most of the region's governments have signed
onto or otherwise recognized at least a few of the U.N.
refugee agreements. Countries receiving refugees in the
region have adhered to the principle ofnonrefoulement,
though in practice there have been many problems:
access to the legalistic asylum-seeking process is diffi-
cult in all the countries; in Honduras, Salvadoran refu-
gees have been attacked and killed by Honduran soldiers
while crossing the border, approaching the Honduran
camps, and even in the camps; in Mexico, all refugees are
subject to expulsion at any time without cause.
Steps towards improving international refugee coor-
dination in the region have increased in recent years,
starting with the various refugee resolutions incorpo-
rated into the "Central American Peace Plan" of 1984
(Esquipulus I) enacted by the Contadora Group, and
the resolutions on refugee principles signed in the Cart-
agena Declaration of 1984.
In 1987, the Advisory Group on Possible Solutions to
Central American Refugee Problems began the process
of regional intergovernmental planning and coopera-
tion on refugee issues. In August 1987, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras signed
the "Arias Peace Plan" (Esquipulus II), further outlin-
ing regional goals for refugee assistance. In 1988, the
U.N. responded to the peace initiative by approving a
Special Plan of Economic Cooperation (PEC) for Cen-
tral America. PEC's goals were to use development
programs to link social and economic policies with the
long-term Central American peace process.
An important component of PEC receiving early
implementation was PRODERE-the Development Pro-
gram for Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Returnees in
Central America. Drafted in late 1988, PRODERE has
used grassroots projects to promote sustainable devel-
opment in Central America. Projects have included
food aid, community organization, health and sanita-
tion provisions, promotion of economic activity, infra-
structure improvements, and legal aid. It is coordinated
by the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), and in-
cludes program assistance from UNHCR, the Interna-
tional Labor Organization, and the World Health Or-
ganization.
In May 1989, Guatemala hosted the first Interna-
tional Conference on Central American Refugees
(CIREFCA), which brought together representatives
from UNHCR, UNDP, the principal NGOs, and the
principally affected countries. CIREFCA delegates
reaffirmed previous resolutions on Central American
refugee issues, as well as recommending the following:
development of a North American convention on human
rights; recognition of the role ofNGOs in refugee assis-
tance; assistance to refugee host nations; and support of
the Arias Peace Plan.
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Be-
lize, Guatemala, and Mexico all submitted toCIREFCA
specific project requests for relief and development for
refugee populations. This commitment of all of the
region's governments to cooperate with each other and
the U.N. in development-oriented refugee projects was
an admission that no one was expecting peace to break
out anytime soon in Central America, as well as a
recognition that such an unlikely peace would not, in any
case, bring about an immediate reversal of refugee flows
or provide for smooth refugee returns.
CIREFCA was conceived as a bridge to link emer-
gency-oriented refugee activities to longer-term devel-
opment initiatives. CIREFCA accomplished several
important things:
• all the host countries seriously evaluated their refu-
gee problems;
- the historic tendency to subj ugate humanitarian refu-
gee issues to national security was diminished;
• host countries made firm refugee policy commit-
ments;
• service-providers developed more coordination of
resources and services;
• dialogue among NGOs, the U.N., and host countries
improved;
• host countries agreed that solutions for the displaced
needed to be long-term because the refugees had
become a major structural problem; and
• UNDP linked CIREFCA to portions of itsPEC man-
date, thereby establishing strong ties between UNDP
and UNHCR in the region for the first time. 13
With technical assistance from CIREFCA headquar-
ters in Costa Rica, CIREFCA delegates produced solid
documentation on their refugee plans for health, educa-
tion, agricultural production, and basic community in-
frastructure. CIREFCA projects were not expected to
reach all of the 2 million-plus refugees in the region, but
they were expected to address the most urgent refugee
needs. Though internal strife persists in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua, regional cooperation has
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definitely brought new hope for organized humanitar-
ian assistance to Central American refugees and af-
fected communities.
Refugees in Costa Rica since CIREFCA
Costa Rica has always been an active participant in
the long-term CIREFCA process. As UNHCR official
Jose" Riera pointed out to me in May 1990, Costa Rica
probably administered some S35 million in interna-
tional refugee aid between 1981 and 1989: "If this had
been in job-creation instead of maintenance, imagine
the economic development." 14 Though hoping for sig-
nificant refugee (especially Nicaraguan) repatriation,
Costa Rica recognized the potential benefits of pro-
ceeding with CIREFCA.
Costa Rica's request for CIREFCA funding in May
19S9 was S80 million. Some of the first CIREFCA
projects implemented in Costa Rica included: a low-
income housing project, paid for by Sweden; the closing
of the Alvaperal camp, paid for by Spain; and the closing
down of the Lim6n refugee camp by giving all the
residents the means to integrate into the community
(housing materials, small business loans, etc.), paid for
by the PRODERE fund.
PRODERE continued to fund refugee projects in
1990, with plans for "integrated rural development in
different communities," targeting some 300 refugee
families and 300 low-income Costa Rican families. 15 In
addition, Costa Rica requested more international fund-
ing at the June 1990 CIREFCA meeting. Costa Rica's
General Directorate for Refugees drafted a total of nine
project and program requests, divided into three catego-
ries: institutional, economic, and social.
The first institutional project was to be a National
Census of Undocumented Aliens. Official documents
would be provided to the undocumented, and Costa
Rica would study the possibility ofallowing them access
to basic Costa Rican local governmental services. This
documentation would also serve as work authorization.
Related to the census would bea "Migratory Regulation
and Legalization of Refugees and Undocumented Ali-
ens": six regional migration centers would be constructed
and staffed to provide reception, regulate migration,
and administer repatriation. The final institutional pro-
gram would be a "Reinforcement of the Ministry of
Labour for the Labour Insertion of Refugees and Un-
documented Aliens.. .into the Costa Rican job market".
Coordinated analysis of refugees and employment op-
portunities would result in the establishment of a na-
tional employment bureau to benefit both refugees and
Costa Ricans looking for work.
Costa Rica submitted four social projects for CI-
REFCA funding in June 1990. The first was "Strength-
ening of National Health Services for Refugees and
Undocumented Aliens." This was to be a 3-year project
to expand infrastructure and programs in the sectors of
primary health care, occupational safety and health,
sanitation, nutrition, etc., in areas highly populated by
refugees. Second was "Educational Infrastructure Needs
to Benefit Refugees, Undocumented Aliens and Na-
tionals"-also a 3-year project targeted for the areas
heavily inhabited by refugees. The projectwould involve
repairing 40 old classrooms; constructing 47 new class-
rooms, 49 new bathrooms, and 60 faculty houses; fur-
nishing 2,500 desks; and providing miscellaneous edu-
cational supplies. The third social program submitted
was for "Housing Credit for Refugees and Nationals
The commitment of all of the region's
governments to cooperated with each other
and the U.N. in development-oriented refugee
projects was an admission that no one was
expectingpeace to break out anytime soon
in Central America...
Participating in Mixed Productive Projects." The goals
were to provide credit to refugees for the purchase of550
homes—with an emphasis on self-construction efforts—
at an average cost per unit of $3,000. Housing credits
were expected to assist 100 Costa Rican families and 400
refugee families. The project would (in theory) allow
future repatriates to transfer their units to "another
refugee family or to a Costa Rican family of similar
socio-economic standing" and, in effect, the repatriates
could negotiate getting their loan bought out. Finally, a
social program was submitted for "Child Care for Refu-
gee, Undocumented, and Costa Rican Mothers." The
plan included construction of four new daycare centers
and the expansion and/or repair of 13 others in the
Lim6n and San Jose areas. It was intended to benefit 640
children. Daycare centers are still uncommon in Costa
Rica, and expansion of child care options is crucial,
particularly in light of Costa Rica's trend towards fe-
male-headed households.
The two broad economic projects submitted for fund-
ing were "Training and Credit for Refugees in Costa
Rica and/or Returnees in Nicaragua," and "Support for
Productive and Communal Activities to Attain Self-
SufficiencyAmong the Nicaraguan Refugee Population
Remaining in Costa Rica." In the first,
Those who opt for voluntary repatriation will receive
job training, in coordination with Nicaragua.. ..For
those who remain in Costa Rica, training will be
provided in the context of the Costa Rican employ-
ment market and will facilitate access to credit for the
consolidation of small business and/or family-run
enterprises. The cost of training is estimated to be
US$900 per capita;. ..credit has been established at a
level of US$1,220 per beneficiary.
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Refugees wait in line at the Office ofMigration ofRefugees in San Jose.
The training and credit project was intended to help
6,590 refugees (1,318 heads of households). This project
is to be run by ACIAR, a NGO which already has
substantial relevant experience. Regarding the second
Economic program,
The goals of this project, which will last 3 years, are
the following: economic self-sufficiency for at least 80
families through their incorporation into productive
agricultural projects; incorporation ofsome 90 heads
of households into permanent salaried positions with
agricultural businesses and industries; establishment
ofsmall family production and service businesses and
shops for 40 families with semiskilled labor who
require a little assistance to attain self-sufficiency;
integration of 90 heads of households as partners in
solvent existing small businesses and productive or-
ganizations; and guaranteed access to basic commu-
nity public services (health, education, water, elec-
tricity, etc.).
The expected beneficiaries would be 300 rural refu-
gee and Costa Rican families "of limited means." This is
obviously an ambitious project, but similar (albeit smaller-
scale) projects have already been successfully imple-
mented in Costa Rica. 16
Despite continued CIREFCA planning in 1990 and
1991, Costa Rica has maintained voluntary repatriation
as her refugee policy of greatest importance; unfortu-
nately, the disappointing numbers of voluntary repatri-
ates has finally led Costa Rica to consider deportation.
In July 1990, Costa Rica initiated a 12-month period in
which undocumented refugees were asked to file for
residential permits, student permits, or other appropri-
ate documentation. Rosa Eugenia Castro of the Gen-
eral Directorate for Refugees told me on April 1, 1991,
that if the undocumented did not apply for status by July
1991, they would be deported.
Evidently, there are still many refugees afraid to come
forward to attempt registration in Costa Rica. On Feb-
ruary 2, 1991, the Raleigh News and Observer reported
that Costa Rica was planning to deport 75,000 illegal
aliens, and Luis Guardia of the Costa Rican embassy in
Washington confirmed on February 22, 1991, that 70,000
deportations were planned. As the end of 1991 ap-
proached, this number of deportations had still not been
reached, and the future of illegal aliens in Costa Rica
remains uncertain.
Costa Rica appears to be at an important crossroads
in refugee policy. In many ways, Costa Rica has led the
way in careful and humanitarian planning for Central
American refugees, as well as cooperation with the U.N.
She is evidently worn out economically, however, un-
able to obtain international donations sufficient to cover
the economic and social costs of trying to sustain, let
alone integrate, the huge numbers of refugees inside her
borders. Costa Rica is also led by a new president with
less interest in regional diplomacy and cooperation than
in national economic development.
Conclusions about Refugee Planning
The international community can learn many lessons
from Costa Rica's first decade of massive refugee recep-
tion. One of the most important lessons is that refugee
needs cannot easily be separated from the needs of the
rest of the country; even refugees in camps will have an
effect on local roads, water use, food consumption,
employment patterns, and so forth. Refugees free to
move and work where they like will have an even bigger
impact-an impact that can be beneficial, or at least
neutral, ifwell-planned and aided by outside funding. A
humanitarian response to refugees also appears to have
some ameliorative effect on regional peacemaking ef-
forts. Finally, the international community should not
take advantage of a host country's generosity by denying
her adequate financial aid and planning assistance for
her refugee services, nor by refusing to accept a fair share
of refugees for resettlement.
Once one looks past the political complexities, refu-
gee services require the basic elements of development
planning. Thus, the first task of refugee service provid-
ers is to minimize the political constraints on their job-
-either by indirect lobbying, international concessions,
or separation ofcontroversial issues from main resettle-
ment projects. Once political obstacles are neutralized
(or minimized), refugee planning should be integrated
into comprehensive development programs.
In a broader sense, the Central American refugee
crisis has dramatized the need to reassess the response
to refugees throughout the world. Although host gov-
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ernments are reluctant to see international assistance go
to refugees rather than citizens, development-oriented
assistance can prove beneficial to both the refugees as
well as the surrounding communities. Writing for the
Population Council, Charles Keely has taken this ap-
proach to a more radical level:
...refugees are a product of underdevelopment. Since
over 95 percent of the world's refugees are in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America, one should question whether
a strategy emphasizing camps and third-country re-
settlement that developed in a European context is
becoming increasingly unable to cope with current
realities....resources should be channeled to asylum
countries to make refugees self-sustaining, and there
should be development aid for indigenous popula-
tions in theareas of host countrieswhere refugees are
given asylum. 17
Resettlement workers should forego the assumption
that refugees are only temporary residents, and make
medium- or long-term plans on their behalf. Even if they
were to repatriate, the process would be slow, and thus
allow for a gradual phase-out of any programs, or a
transformation of successful programs from refugee-
orientation to citizen-orientation (i.e., small-scale en-
terprises could be sold or given to local citizens, housing
could be transferred, etc.). Resettlement workers should,
if financial resources permit, give refugees access to the
full range of social services necessary to mainstream
them-housing,job referrals, transportation, education,
etc. This is a productive use of relief funds that should
serve to enable refugees to become participatory and
contributory members of society, if only temporarily.
Integration depends on local economies as well as
political attitudes towards the refugees. Planners must
learn to view refugees as residents with special needs-
not as foreigners with separate needs-and plan compre-
hensive policies encompassing them. Planners should
also involve the refugees in the planning process.
Obstacles to successful policies for refugee-planning
remain. First of all, there is always concern that treating
refugees too weli will encourage further migration. Though
this possibility cannot be entirely denied, one must not
forget that the original wave ofmigration was not caused
by expectations of a cushy life somewhere else, but
rather from a desperate need to escape an unlivable
situation in the country of origin. Few people depart
their homelands without serious emotional trauma and,
while rumors of great treatment on the other side of the
border may be a decisive factor in deciding to leave, such
expectations would never be the initial factor motivat-
ing the migrants to go. In addition, development-ori-
ented refugee planning is a slow process and could not
even begin logistically before analysts have had enough
time to assess whether or not there is a good chance that
the refugees will be able to return to their homelands
"soon." However, in situations where development-
oriented or integration-oriented refugee planning is
economically or politically unacceptable, the host coun-
try should consider lobbying for resettlement to a third
country rather than leaving the refugees to languish
indefinitely in camps.
Ultimately, no matter how many international agree-
ments are signed, independent states will not yield sov-
ereigntywhen it comes to immigration. Even ifa country
is bound by treaty not to deport someone to the country
from which he/she fled, the country might still force the
refugee to go to a third country. Even the most rational
and depoliticized planners cannot escape the political
baggage attached to refugee planning. Understanding of
the issues involved is the key to doing as much as
possible for these people who have suffered so much.
[Editor's note: This research coincided with the inaugura-
tion ofa new Costa Ricanpresident, andalso came shortly
after the inauguration ofa new Nicaraguan president, and
therefore pertained to refugee policies that would soon
thereafter undergo significant change.]
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